Urgent lesson from H1N1
Published: Thursday, January 7, 2010 at 6:01 a.m.
Last Modified: Wednesday, January 6, 2010 at 3:32 p.m.
For generations, the United States has neglected to nurture the technologies and systems needed to respond to emergencies related to disease. Nowhere has this been more evident than in the response to H1N1.
To make flu vaccine, we rely on a 60-year-old production method based on chicken eggs.
It is safe but slow and has led to long lines at clinics and shortages of vaccine. It is not just that priority groups have been left unprotected. We learned last month that this method leads to multiple manufacturing issues, such as the recall of 800,000 children's vaccine doses, due to diminished potency.
Our nation relies on a disease surveillance system that doesn't give useful information about an epidemic, such as the severity of illness, transmission rates and spread of disease in communities. Even today, we have no idea how many people have had the H1N1 virus. If this country had an up-to-date system, we could make better decisions about school closings, infection control guidance and antiviral drug use.
We also rely on an outdated, slow method for diagnosing cases of H1N1. Our diagnostic technologies are difficult, expensive and time-consuming. If rapid tests were available, people who are sick could get treatment sooner, and we could determine the size of an outbreak, whether the disease is getting more severe and how to target limited health resources.
In short, despite the tireless efforts of public health and health-care workers, America's experience with H1N1 shows that the nation is not prepared to deal with a flu pandemic.
The really bad news is that we are far more prepared to respond to a flu outbreak than to any other biological event, natural or manmade, such as the ebola virus.
In six to nine months last year, the United States was able to identify this new H1N1 virus, make vaccine and begin distributing it, though in inadequate amounts.
There is no other disease to which our public health infrastructure could respond anywhere near as quickly. For most new diseases, the response time would be more like six to nine years.
We are the leaders of the congressionally mandated Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, which found in 2008 that it was not just possible but probable that terrorists would succeed in using a weapon of mass destruction somewhere in the world by 2013 and that the weapon would most likely be biological.
We can anticipate the likely pathogens terrorists would use, but this information is meaningless if we do not have the stockpiles, medical countermeasures and tested plans for distributing them to affected areas. Terrorists will not give us six months' warning before deploying a biological weapon.
The major review that Secretary of Health and Human Services Kathleen Sebelius announced recently for our nation's capabilities for developing and distributing countermeasures is a step in the right direction. But this must happen quickly, and it is only the beginning of the journey to full preparedness.
Bob Graham, a former Democratic senator from Florida, and Jim Talent, a former Republican senator from Missouri, are chairman and co-chairman of the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism. Graham also is a former governor of Florida.
Reader comments posted to this article may be published in our print edition. All rights reserved. This copyrighted material may not be re-published without permission. Links are encouraged.
Comments are currently unavailable on this article